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COMMON SENSE OR UNNECESSARY 
COMPLEXITY? THE RECENT CHANGE TO 
THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN NEW SOUTH 
WALES 
ASHLEY CAMERON 
The New South Wales government has now enacted section 89A of the 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which will significantly amend the right to silence. 
The new provision allows courts in certain circumstances to draw 
unfavourable inferences from evidence of silence in criminal proceedings. 
Parliament has justified the legislation as a ‘common sense’ approach, 
intended to prevent offenders hiding behind a wall of silence. However the 
benefits of the legislation are expected to be minimal at best. Although critics 
have already put forward weighty theoretical arguments opposing the 
enactment of the new provision, how it will operate in New South Wales 
courts remains to be seen. This article will undertake a detailed comparative 
analysis, examining the operation of similar legislation in the United 
Kingdom to determine how section 89A might be interpreted and applied in 
New South Wales. This analysis suggests that the need for extensive and 
complicated jury directions, the problems in determining whether the 
provision is to be invoked at all, and the complex test used in deciding 
whether it was reasonable for the accused to remain silent, will create 
significant difficulties in the application of section 89A. It is contended that 
the number and seriousness of these difficulties, coupled with the only limited 
benefit (if any) to be derived from the section, justify the close monitoring of 
section 89A and its review at an appropriate time.     
I INTRODUCTION  
The New South Wales Parliament has recently enacted section 89A of the 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), significantly altering the statutory pre-trial right to 
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silence.1 Previously, a fundamental common law rule applied, according to 
which those who believed on reasonable grounds that they were suspected of a 
criminal offence were entitled to remain silent when questioned by officials;2 
no unfavourable inferences could be drawn against them because of their 
silence.3 Indeed, as stated by the High Court in Petty v The Queen, ‘to draw 
such an adverse inference would be to erode the right of silence or to render it 
valueless’.4 The rule is reflected, although more narrowly,5 in section 89 of the 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which prevents unfavourable inferences being 
drawn from a failure to answer questions or respond to representations of an 
investigating official.6 It should be noted that the common law remains 
applicable ‘except so far as [the Evidence] Act provides otherwise expressly or 
by necessary intendment’.7 Thus, to the extent to which the common law is not 
expressly or impliedly contradicted, the common law will continue to apply. 
However, in line with recent trends which seek to narrow the right to silence,8 
the new legislation now allows the court, in some circumstances, to draw 
unfavourable inferences from evidence that accused persons, when questioned 
by police, failed to mention facts which they later relied upon at trial.9 Thus, in 
the words of the High Court, the previously applicable common law right to 
silence has been eroded or rendered valueless in these cases.10 Although the 
right to silence existing immediately prior to the recent enactment was not 
absolute, section 89A is a substantial and controversial amendment to the law, 
which is arguably unjustified.  
It is contended that section 89A causes such significant problems in its 
operation that its enactment may be unwarranted. Although critics11 have so far 
                                                 
1 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89A, as inserted by Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) 
Act 2013 (NSW) sch 1 item 2.   
2 Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95 [2] (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Sanchez v R (2009) 196 A Crim R 472 [71]; Stephen Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (Thomson 
Reuters, 10th ed, 2012) [1.3.5680]. 
6 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89. 
7 Ibid s 9.  
8 See, eg, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34L, the Australian 
Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 30 and the Independent Commission against Corruption 
Act 1988 (NSW) ss 21–22, in which statutes the federal and NSW Parliaments have enacted 
legislation designed to override the common law right to silence.  
9 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89A(1). 
10 Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95 [2] (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
11 See, eg, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, The Right to Silence, Report No 95 
(2000)); David Harmer et al, Submission on Exposure Draft: Evidence Amendment (Evidence 
of Silence) Bill 2012 (September 2012) <https://law.anu.edu.au/sites/all/files/users/u4810180 
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been unsuccessful in swaying the legislature, an analysis of similar legislation 
in the United Kingdom, from which the new provision was modelled, indicates 
that section 89A will introduce significant complexity and inefficiency into the 
law, without any real benefit. Unlike the previously applicable section 89, 
section 89A is highly complex, being subject to numerous restrictions and 
limitations, the interpretation of which remains unclear. Further, the benefits of 
the new legislation are minimal and evidence of silence has only limited 
evidentiary value in the trial of offenders. Therefore, the amount of judicial time 
that can be expected to be spent on section 89A, and the significant uncertainty 
regarding its interpretation mean that close monitoring of the provision in the 
short term is warranted and may ultimately justify a review of the legislation at 
some later stage.  
The first part of this article outlines the amendment to the New South Wales 
legislation along with the equivalent legislation enacted in the United Kingdom. 
It then briefly reviews the rationale behind the right to silence, in order to 
demonstrate its fundamental nature, against which its amendment must be 
assessed.  
The second part explains the arguments supporting the use of silence as 
evidence in criminal proceedings, with reference to the purported rationale for 
the amendment and to existing criticisms of it, from a theoretical and policy 
perspective. These criticisms show that the purported benefits will not be 
realised, or will at best be minimal.  
The last part attempts to fill a gap in the literature by undertaking a detailed 
comparative analysis of the new provision with reference to equivalent 
legislation in the United Kingdom. This analysis will focus on the likely 
operation of the new provision in New South Wales.  
A The New Legislation 
On 25 March 2013 the Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Act 2013 
(NSW) passed unaltered through both houses of the New South Wales 
Parliament. This legislation inserted section 89A into the Evidence Act 1995 
(NSW) in relation to the use of silence as evidence in criminal proceedings. The 
legislation was enacted as part of a package, together with the Criminal 
Procedure Amendment (Mandatory Pre-Trial Defence Disclosure) Act 2013 
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(NSW). Both Acts were proclaimed on 1 September 2013 and commenced 
operation on 1 September 2013.   
In its enacted form, section 89A provides as follows: 
(1) In a criminal proceeding for a serious indictable offence, such 
unfavourable inferences may be drawn as appear proper from evidence that, 
during official questioning in relation to the offence, the defendant failed or 
refused to mention a fact: 
(a) that the defendant could reasonably have been expected to mention in 
the circumstances existing at the time, and 
(b) that is relied on in his or her defence in that proceeding. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply unless: 
(a) a special caution was given to the defendant by an investigating 
official who, at the time the caution was given, had reasonable cause to 
suspect that the defendant had committed the serious indictable offence, 
and 
(b) the special caution was given before the failure or refusal to mention 
the fact, and 
(c) the special caution was given in the presence of an Australian legal 
practitioner who was acting for the defendant at that time, and 
(d) the defendant had, before the failure or refusal to mention the fact, 
been allowed a reasonable opportunity to consult with that Australian 
legal practitioner, in the absence of the investigating official, about the 
general nature and effect of special cautions. 
(3) It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in giving a 
special caution. 
(4) An investigating official must not give a special caution to a person being 
questioned in relation to an offence unless satisfied that the offence is a 
serious indictable offence. 
(5) This section does not apply: 
(a) to a defendant who, at the time of the official questioning, is under 18 
years of age or is incapable of understanding the general nature and effect 
of a special caution, or 
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(b) if evidence of the failure or refusal to mention the fact is the only 
evidence that the defendant is guilty of the serious indictable offence. 
(6) The provisions of this section are in addition to any other provisions 
relating to a person being cautioned before being investigated for an offence 
that the person does not have to say or do anything. The special caution may 
be given after or in conjunction with that caution. 
(7) Nothing in this section precludes the drawing of any inference from 
evidence of silence that could properly be drawn apart from this section. 
(8) The giving of a special caution in accordance with this section in relation 
to a serious indictable offence does not of itself make evidence obtained after 
the giving of the special caution inadmissible in proceedings for any other 
offence (whether or not a serious indictable offence). 
(9) In this section: 
“official questioning” of a defendant in relation to a serious indictable 
offence means questions put to the defendant by an investigating official who 
at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of 
the commission, or possible commission, of the serious indictable offence. 
“special caution” means a caution given to a person that is to the effect that: 
(a) the person does not have to say or do anything, but it may harm the 
person’s defence if the person does not mention when questioned 
something the person later relies on in court, and 
(b) anything the person does say or do may be used in evidence. 
Thus, section 89A provides that in certain circumstances the trier of fact may 
draw such unfavourable inferences as appear proper from evidence that the 
defendant12 failed or refused to mention a fact during official questioning.13 The 
unfavourable inferences may be drawn only where the defendant could 
reasonably have been expected to mention the relevant fact in the circumstances 
existing at the time of the official questioning and where the defendant later 
relies on the relevant fact in his or her defence in the proceedings.14 The 
                                                 
12 The New South Wales legislation uses the term ‘defendant’, while the equivalent United 
Kingdom legislation uses the term ‘accused’. This article will refer to the ‘defendant’ when 
discussing the New South Wales provision, and to the ‘accused’ when discussing the United 
Kingdom provision.  
13 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89A(1).  
14 Ibid. 
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legislation defines ‘official questioning’ as questions put by an investigating 
official who was at the time performing his or her functions in connection with 
the investigation of a serious indictable offence.15 Further, the section applies 
only to serious indictable offences, which are defined in section four of the 
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) as offences which are punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of five years or more. This will limit the application of section 
89A to proceedings before the Supreme or District Court.16 
Section 89A is also limited by a number of exceptions. First, inferences may be 
drawn only where a ‘special caution’17 has been given to the defendant by an 
investigating official. The special caution must be given once the investigating 
official has reasonable cause to suspect the defendant of a serious indictable 
offence and before the failure to disclose. The term ‘special caution’ is defined 
in the new provision.18 While particular words are not necessary, the special 
caution must warn the defendant that, although they do not have to do or say 
anything, it may harm their defence not to mention something that they later 
rely upon in court, and that anything they do say or do may be used in 
evidence.19 The special caution must also be provided in the presence of an 
Australian legal practitioner who is at the time acting for the defendant and who 
has had a reasonable opportunity to consult with the defendant.20 This limitation 
was introduced in response to criticisms that the special caution would put 
undue pressure on the defendant to speak,21 and to ensure that accused persons 
understood the potential consequences of their silence.22 Section 89A will also 
not apply to defendants under the age of 18 years or those who are incapable of 
understanding the special caution.23 Finally, the evidence of silence cannot be 
relied upon where it is the only evidence of a person’s guilt.24 Therefore, silence 
                                                 
15 Ibid s 89A(9). 
16 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 8. 
17 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89A(2).   
18 Ibid s 89A(9). 
19 Ibid s 89A(3). 
20 Ibid s 89A(2).   
21 See under heading II: Silence as Evidence, below.  
22 Unlike the position in England and Wales, accused persons in New South Wales do not have 
ready access to duty solicitors in police stations who can provide advice to accused about their 
legal rights. As the Law Reform Commission acknowledged at [2.139] of Report No 95, current 
legal aid funding would be insufficient to provide such duty solicitors and is unlikely to be 
increased for this purpose. See New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 11, 
[2.139]. 
23 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89A(5)(a).   
24 Ibid s 89A(5)(b). 
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must be supported by other evidence in order to lead to a conviction of the 
defendant.  
The new provision was modelled on equivalent United Kingdom legislation,25 
which similarly allows a court to draw adverse inferences from the accused 
person’s failure to mention facts when questioned or charged.26 That legislation 
— section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK) — 
provides that the court or jury ‘may draw such inferences … as appear proper’27 
where the accused ‘failed to mention any fact later relied upon in his defence’.28 
The relevant fact must also be one which, in the circumstances, the accused 
person could reasonably have been expected to mention.29 Unlike the New 
South Wales provision, section 34 applies to a failure to mention such facts 
either 1) prior to being charged, when being questioned by a constable, 2) upon 
being charged with an offence or 3) upon the accused/suspect being officially 
informed that he or she might be prosecuted for an offence.30 As is the case in 
New South Wales, section 34 includes a provision that the accused person must 
first have been allowed an opportunity to consult a solicitor,31 and that the 
accused was administered the relevant caution.32 However, unlike the position 
in New South Wales, the relevant caution does not need to be given in the 
presence of a legal practitioner. Also, section 34 does not expressly exclude the 
application of the provision to accused persons under a certain age or those who 
do not understand the relevant caution.33 Finally, section 38(3) of the United 
Kingdom legislation provides that an accused person cannot be convicted solely 
upon inferences drawn under section 34, which has the same effect as section 
89A(5)(b) of the New South Wales provision.34 
The policy considerations behind the enactment of both provisions were quite 
similar. Parliamentary members of the New South Wales Liberal Party justified 
                                                 
25 ABC News, ‘O’Farrell Government overhauls “right to silence”’, 7:30 Report, 19 August 2012 
(Quentin Dempster) <http:// www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-19/ofarrell-government-
overhauls-right-to-silence /4208348>. 
26 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK).  
27 Ibid s 34(2). 
28 Ibid s 34(1). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid ss 34(1)(a)–(b).  
31 Ibid s 34(2A). 
32 Ibid s 34(1)(a). 
33 Ibid s 34. 
34 Ibid s 38. 
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section 89A as ‘simply a matter of common sense’.35 The Attorney-General, 
Greg Smith, echoed the Liberal Party arguments, stating that section 89A was 
primarily aimed at breaking down the perceived ‘wall of silence’36 behind 
which suspects at the ‘higher end of criminal activity’37 were thought to hide. 
Greg Smith also argued that the new legislation would prevent accused persons 
from frustrating criminal justice by exercising their right to silence, thus 
reducing delays in criminal trials, producing efficiency and promoting 
‘fairness’38 for both the prosecution and the accused. These justifications are 
very similar to those relied upon by the Conservative Party in the United 
Kingdom. They too referred to the legislation as a ‘restoration of common 
sense’,39 and justified the new provision as likely to increase conviction rates 
by preventing the guilty from using silence as a shield.40 
Interestingly, the reference in the Second Reading Speech of Greg Smith to the 
notion of ‘fairness’ seems to directly contradict criticisms that the new 
legislation will undermine the right to a fair trial. The High Court of Australia 
in Dietrich v R discussed at length the concept of the fair trial,41 confirming 
earlier decisions that the right to a fair trial is a fundamental common law right 
in Australia.42 The Court accepted that, while the insistence on a fair trial is 
firmly established as a ‘central pillar’ of criminal justice,43 the precise principles 
that constitute that right are not so clearly defined.44 The question becomes how 
far the right to a fair trial extends on the facts of each case. This is because in 
Australia there is no exhaustive or comprehensive definition of the attributes of 
a fair trial.45 Thus, what is ‘fair’ remains uncertain. Nevertheless, the 
juxtaposition between what Parliament considers ‘fair’ and what critics argue 
is required for a fair trial, shows the clear disparity between different concepts 
of fairness. It also highlights the need to balance the competing interests of the 
                                                 
35 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 20 March 2013, 1 (Michael 
Gallacher); New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 13 March 2013, 
85 (Greg Smith). 
36 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 13 March 2013, 87 (Greg 
Smith). 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid 85, 96. 
39 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 11 January 1994, 80 (Betty 
Boothroyd). 
40 Ibid 44, 86.   
41 Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292. 
42 See, eg, Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75; Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 
CLR 23. 
43 Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292, 298 (Mason CJ and McHugh J).  
44 Ibid 300 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), 326 (Deane J), 353 (Toohey J), 362–4 (Gaudron J). 
45 Ibid 300 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), 353 (Toohey J). 
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prosecution against those of the accused.46 The new provision attempts to strike 
that balance of fairness more in favour of the prosecution than was previously 
the case, by encouraging early disclosure. The question which remains, and 
which cannot be definitively answered, is whether this new balance actually 
produces fairness between the parties.   
B The Rationale for the Right to Silence 
The right to silence is not a single legal principle, but rather consists of ‘a 
collection of principles and rules’.47 These principles include the right against 
self-incrimination, the right to refuse to assist the prosecution and the right to 
not disclose one’s defence until trial.48 However, these principles have been 
substantially narrowed in recent years as legislators have sought to increase the 
‘efficiency’ of the court system.49 This is particularly evident from the 
enactment of Division 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) in 2009, 
which requires ‘certain pre-trial disclosure’ by parties ‘in order to reduce delays 
in proceedings’.50 Further, many investigative authorities have now been 
empowered to compel disclosure, such compulsion overriding any previously 
existing right to silence.51 While the right to silence has always been subject to 
limitations and exceptions, even at common law,52 the recent trend has been to 
increase such limitations, further restricting what remained of the right to 
silence in Australian law. Thus, the section 89A enactment forms part of a 
broader trend.  
                                                 
46 See, eg, James Jacob Spigelman, ‘The Truth Can Cost Too Much: The Principle of a Fair Trial’ 
(2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 29, 44.  
47 Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50 [7] (Gleeson CJ). 
48 Barbara Ann Hocking and Laura Leigh Manville, ‘What of the Right to Silence: Still 
Supporting the Presumption of Innocence, or a Growing Legal Fiction?’ (2001) 1(1) Macquarie 
Law Journal 63, 89; K A Cavanaugh, ‘Emergency Rule, Normalcy Exception: The Erosion of 
the Right to Silence in the United Kingdom’ (2002) 35 Cornell International Law Journal 491, 
492. 
49 Anthony Gray, ‘Constitutionally Heeding the Right to Silence in Australia’ (2013) 39(1) 
Monash University Law Review 156, 163. 
50 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 134(1). 
51 See, eg, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 34L; Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 30; Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988 
(NSW) ss 21–22.  
52 Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217, [51]–[53]; Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 
205 CLR 50, [68]; New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 11, [2.8]; Steven 
Greer, ‘The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current Debate’ (1990) 53(6) Modern Law 
Review 709, 712. 
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Although the right to silence is recognised in a number of jurisdictions,53 its 
origins and justifications are not entirely certain. The most widely accepted 
theory is that the right to silence developed in 16th-century England out of the 
significant opposition to the use of the inquisitorial oath by the ecclesiastical 
courts.54 The inquisitorial procedure required accused persons to make a 
statement on oath with respect to accusations made against them.55 It became 
the subject of much hostility as critics argued that it was open to abuse by the 
arresting authorities and examining justices and was believed to produce 
erroneous confessions.56 By the early 17th century, argument in opposition to 
the inquisitorial oath began to rely upon the Magna Carta and the common law, 
which limited the Crown’s sovereignty.57 The ecclesiastical courts during the 
reign of Charles 1 continued to impose the oath despite this opposition. In a 
landmark case in 1639, the Star Chamber convicted John Lilburne of contempt 
for refusing to take the oath. As a reaction to this conviction, and with the 
political tide turning against the Crown, Parliament in 1641 ruled Lilburne’s 
sentence illegal, abolished the ecclesiastical courts and barred the use of the 
oath in penal cases.58 Thus, the right to silence was firmly in place by the late 
17th century.59  
Other theories suggest that the right to silence originated much earlier from 
Roman-Canon law and applied first to witnesses as a right against self-
incrimination. MacNair proposes that the right was then extended in the late 
17th century into a general right to silence for persons accused of a crime.60 It 
was justified as removing the conflict of conscience between giving a statement 
on oath and protecting oneself against punishment.61 Other legal historians trace 
the right back to criminal procedures adopted in the Middle Ages, which 
entirely excluded confession evidence on the basis that it was unreliable.62 On 
                                                 
53 Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B, pt 1 (‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’) ss 7, 
11(c); United States Constitution amend V; Constitution (India) 1949, art 20(3); Murray v 
United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 
18731/91, 8 February 1996) [45].  
54 Greer, above n 52, 710; J Wood and A Crawford, ‘The Right of Silence: The Case for 
Retention’ [1989] London: Civil Liberties Trust 37, 42.  
55 Gregory O’Reilly, ‘England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves towards an Inquisitorial 
System of Justice’ (1994) 85(2) Journal of Criminal law and Criminology 402, 410–11. 
56 Ibid 421–2; New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 11, [2.3]–[2.5]. 
57 O’Reilly, above n 55, 415.  
58 Ibid 417–8. 
59 Ibid 418. 
60 M R T MacNair, ‘The Early Development of the Privilege against Self-incrimination’ (1990) 
10(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 66. See also Greer, above n 52, 710–11.  
61 MacNair, above n 60.  
62 Ibid. 
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the other hand, the 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, chaired by 
Sir Cyril Philips, places the origins of the right to silence much later, in the 19th 
century, suggesting that it was implemented to offset disadvantages that the 
accused experienced due to the power imbalance between the accused and the 
State.63 
The right to silence was nevertheless adopted into Australian jurisprudence 
upon settlement.64 In the decision of the High Court of Australia in Petty v The 
Queen,65 the Court expressly confirmed its application in Australian law, 
referring to it as a ‘fundamental rule of the common law’.66 The Court held that 
the drawing of adverse inferences against accused persons because they had 
exercised their right to silence was impermissible67 and amounted to a source 
of entrapment.68 In subsequent decisions the Court has held that it will often be 
appropriate for a judge to give directions discouraging a jury from drawing any 
adverse inferences from evidence of silence.69 Legislation has also been enacted 
in most Australian jurisdictions which expressly precludes the court in criminal 
proceedings drawing adverse inferences from evidence of silence.70 While 
section 89 does allow the tendering of evidence about which the accused 
remained silent during official questioning, it will be permissible only where 
the purpose of such tender is not solely to draw adverse inferences from the 
silence.  
Further, these provisions are confined to pre-trial silence and do not affect the 
right of the accused to remain silent at the trial, which remains intact. Although 
inroads may have been made into the right to silence in some ‘rare and 
exceptional’ cases at common law,71 and through statutory reform governing 
pre-trial disclosure,72 the entitlement of accused persons not to have inferences 
                                                 
63 Ibid; Andrew L-T Choo, Evidence (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 124–6. United 
Kingdom, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (Philips Commission), Command Paper 
(1981). 
64 Alex C Castles, ‘The Reception and Status of English Law in Australia’ (1963) 2(1) Adelaide 
Law Review 1, 2. 
65 (1991) 173 CLR 95. 
66 Ibid [1] (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
67 Ibid [6] (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
68 Ibid. 
69 R v Hodge [2002] NSWCCA 10 (15 February 2002) [32]. 
70 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 89; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89; Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 89; 
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 89; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 89.  
71 Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217, [51]–[53]; Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 
205 CLR 50 [68]; New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 11, [2.8]; Greer, above 
n 52, 712.  
72 See, eg, Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Div 3.  
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drawn against them because they had exercised their right to silence during 
police questioning remained protected in New South Wales by the application 
of section 89, prior to the recent amendment.73 
The policy considerations behind, and justifications for, the continued 
application of the right to silence provide reasons to resist any further restriction 
of the right. First, the right to silence corrects the power imbalance between the 
accused and the State.74 It forces the State, with its greater resources, to prove 
the case against the accused without relying upon the assistance of the accused 
themselves. It is also seen as necessary to safeguard the autonomy and liberty 
of individuals,75 and to protect their privacy by not prying into their conscience 
and forcing them to swear to potentially incriminating evidence.76 Therefore it 
removes the internal conflict between the desire not to incriminate oneself and 
the perceived need to commit perjury or to act in contempt of court. Also, 
advocates of the accusatorial approach argue that, where the right to silence is 
upheld, the accusatorial approach is less prone to abuse by authorities. This is 
because it forces the prosecution to rely on independent evidence of guilt, rather 
than evidence from the accused.77 For these reasons, it is generally accepted 
that the right to silence is inherent in the right to a fair trial.78 
It is against this background and these justifications, that the amendment to the 
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) must be assessed.  
II SILENCE AS EVIDENCE 
Despite courts labelling the right to silence as ‘fundamental’ to our system of 
criminal justice,79 the New South Wales Parliament has gradually restricted the 
right, most recently by the insertion of section 89A. The recent legislation was 
introduced as a response to several drive-by shootings in Western Sydney, 
during the investigation of which suspects had exercised their right to silence, 
                                                 
73 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89A. 
74 O’Reilly, above n 55, 419–21.  
75 Michael Chaaya, ‘The Right to Silence Reignited: Vulnerable Suspects, Police Questioning 
and Law and Order in New South Wales’ (1998) 22 Criminal Law Journal 82, 84. 
76 O’Reilly, above n 55, 422. 
77 Ibid 421–2. 
78 Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; Murray v United Kingdom (European Court of Human 
Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 18731/91, 8 February 1996) [45]. 
79 R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109, 115 (Hunt CJ at CL); Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 
95, 128–9 (Gaudron J). 
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allegedly creating difficulties for investigating police.80 Michael Gallacher, 
Minister for Police and Emergency, who introduced the Bill to Parliament, 
argued that the package of legislation, which included both mandatory pre-trial 
disclosure and the new section 89A, would result in a ‘crackdown on crime’81 
by preventing accused persons frustrating criminal justice by using the right to 
silence as a shield.82 Mr Gallacher, in his Second Reading Speech, suggested 
that offenders were exploiting the right, hindering police investigations and 
lengthening proceedings and that this in turn was leading to avoidable 
acquittals.83 Thus, the amendment was justified as ‘simply a matter of common 
sense’,84 which would guarantee ‘fairness’ for both the prosecution and the 
accused,85 and make the trial process more efficient.86 
However, whether the new provision achieves these purported objectives 
remains controversial. The findings of empirical studies have undermined many 
of the claimed benefits of this type of legislation. In particular, research 
undertaken in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s, indicates that only 
between four and seven per cent of accused persons exercised their right to 
silence when questioned by police.87 Further, accused persons who exercised 
the right to silence were no less likely to be convicted than those who 
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cooperated.88 Those studies also demonstrated that silence was related to the 
failure to sustain a conviction in less than four per cent of cases where no further 
action was taken, and in under 10 per cent of acquittals or dropped cases.89 
More recent Australian studies have also found that the right to silence is not 
widely exploited and does not impede the conviction of offenders.90 The earlier 
United Kingdom studies into the impact of adverse inference legislation 
internationally, which examined in particular Singapore and Northern Ireland, 
indicate that the new model would have little or no impact on convictions or 
the number of accused people who remain silent.91 Thus, the empirical evidence 
does not support the arguments made by Parliament.  
The legislation also potentially impinges upon fundamental rights. Critics argue 
that the legislation effectively lowers the prosecution’s burden of proof and 
undermines the presumption of innocence.92 Currently, the Crown alone must 
prove criminal allegations, beyond reasonable doubt.93 This forms a 
cornerstone of criminal justice and is essential to the fair trial.94 Although the 
new provision does not reverse the onus of proof or the presumption of 
innocence, it arguably forces the accused in effect to give evidence, whether in 
the form of actual evidence given in the police interview or by way of the 
prosecution being permitted to ask the trier of fact to draw adverse inferences 
from evidence of the accused person’s failure to disclose something later relied 
upon at trial.95 Therefore this new legislation arguably provides the prosecution 
with an ‘evidentiary building block’96 in proving its case.97 If it is true that 
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section 89A will undermine the fair trial, then Parliament’s suggestion that the 
legislation will produce ‘fairness’ for both the prosecution and the accused is 
undermined.98 However, as discussed earlier, this raises the question of what is 
‘fair’ in all of the circumstances.   
Similarly, the new special caution may place ‘irresistible pressure’99 on the 
accused to speak. It could potentially lead to misunderstandings, false 
confessions and even ill treatment, which may in turn produce false 
convictions.100 In a pressured environment the accused may be more prone to 
ramble or lie, rather than honestly stating that they do not recall certain facts.101 
Critics argue that the increased pressure of the special caution may amplify 
these effects, leading suspects to inadvertently incriminate themselves.102 By 
pressuring accused persons to provide a defence immediately, the new 
provision will also encourage false defences. Seidmann and Stein argue that 
this will weaken the uncorroborated explanations made by innocent accused, as 
triers of fact are more likely to dismiss uncorroborated evidence by lumping it 
together with uncorroborated false defences.103 This could in effect produce 
more wrongful convictions as uncorroborated explanations are less likely to be 
accepted.104 Thus, the new legislation may lead to substandard criminal justice.  
Finally, silence has minimal evidentiary value in criminal proceedings.105 This 
is because silence itself often does not provide direct probative evidence of the 
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elements of the offence,106 as it generally107 does not prove any fact in issue in 
the proceedings.108 Further, silence is equivocal and will not necessarily signify 
guilt.109 An accused person may have chosen to remain silent to hide unrelated 
embarrassing conduct, to protect others, because the person has poor 
communication skills or because of a fear that the person’s statement may be 
distorted by police.110 Although section 89A does not require an inference of 
guilt in all circumstances, it may inadvertently encourage triers of fact to infer 
guilt, by permitting such an inference even though the inference may not be 
justified. While it is arguable that silence may have some probative value in 
certain circumstances,111 for example where information surrounding the 
alleged offence is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, the 
common law in Australia already caters for those limited situations.112 
Therefore, as evidence of silence is generally irrelevant or only minimally 
probative, it will often be of only very limited evidentiary value. For these 
reasons, the new legislation provides, rightly, that silence may lead to an 
inference of guilt only when combined with other probative evidence,113 giving 
it no more than a supportive role in convicting offenders.114  
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It is evident from this review that there has been considerable criticism of 
section 89A, and similar legislation enacted in other jurisdictions, from a 
theoretical point of view. The evidence also suggests that, despite parliamentary 
justifications, the new legislation can be expected to provide only very limited 
benefits, if any. However, it remains to be seen how this legislation will operate 
in practice. An analysis of the judicial operation of similar legislation in the 
United Kingdom will help predict how the legislation might operate in New 
South Wales and whether section 89A is justified.   
III COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) UK, the 
equivalent United Kingdom legislation, has now been in operation for 19 
years,115 having come into force on 10 April 1995. Despite judicial efforts to 
simplify the issues that have arisen, this section still represents a complex and 
unsettled area of law. Appellate courts in the United Kingdom have described 
the provision as a ‘notorious minefield’.116 Given that section 89A was 
modelled on section 34,117 an analysis of that provision and how it has been 
applied in the United Kingdom should provide insight into how section 89A 
will operate in New South Wales.  
Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) UK relevantly 
provides as follows:  
(1) Where, in any proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is 
given that the accused—  
(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being 
questioned under caution by a constable trying to discover whether or by 
whom the offence had been committed, failed to mention any fact relied 
on in his defence in those proceedings; or  
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might 
be prosecuted for it, failed to mention any such fact,  
being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time the accused could 
reasonably have been expected to mention when so questioned, charged or 
informed, as the case may be, subsection (2) below applies.  
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(2) Where this subsection applies—  
(a) a magistrates’ court inquiring into the offence as examining justices;  
(b) a judge, in deciding whether to grant an application made by the 
accused under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998  
(c) the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer;  
and  
(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the 
offence charged,  
may draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper.  
(2A) Where the accused was at an authorised place of detention at the time 
of the failure, subsections (1) and (2) above do not apply if he had not been 
allowed an opportunity to consult a solicitor prior to being questioned, 
charged or informed as mentioned in subsection (1) above. 
(3) Subject to any directions by the court, evidence tending to establish the 
failure may be given before or after evidence tending to establish the fact 
which the accused is alleged to have failed to mention.  
(4) This section applies in relation to questioning by persons (other than 
constables) charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging 
offenders as it applies in relation to questioning by constables; and in 
subsection (1) above “officially informed” means informed by a constable or 
any such person.  
(5) This section does not—  
(a) prejudice the admissibility in evidence of the silence or other reaction of 
the accused in the face of anything said in his presence relating to the conduct 
in respect of which he is charged, in so far as evidence thereof would be 
admissible apart from this section; or  
(b) preclude the drawing of any inference from any such silence or other 
reaction of the accused which could properly be drawn apart from this 
section.  
(6) This section does not apply in relation to a failure to mention a fact if the 
failure occurred before the commencement of this section. 
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It is clear that section 34 is very similar to section 89A, exhibiting wording that 
is often identical and that has a similar effect. Both sections permit the trier of 
fact to draw ‘such inferences’118 or such ‘unfavourable inferences’119 as ‘appear 
proper’120 from the defendant’s or the accused’s failure to disclose ‘a fact’,121 
which they could ‘reasonably have been expected to mention’,122 and which 
they later rely upon in the proceedings.123 Given the almost identical wording 
of many of the key phrases of the provisions, it is clear that the United Kingdom 
case law will influence the application of section 89A in New South Wales. 
Also similar is the fact that inferences may not be drawn under either provision 
unless the accused has had an opportunity to consult with a solicitor.124 
However in New South Wales a solicitor must be present when the defendant 
is administered the ‘special caution’.125 The other difference between the 
provisions, which is relevant to this analysis, is that, unlike the New South 
Wales provision which applies only to a failure to disclose a fact ‘during official 
questioning’,126 section 34 applies to a failure to mention a fact either 1) prior 
to being charged, when being questioned by a constable, 2) upon being charged 
with an offence or 3) upon the accused/suspect being officially informed that 
he or she might be prosecuted for an offence.127  
A Judicial Directions 
Judicial directions highlight the complexity of the new legislation. Unless no 
reasonable jury would find that adverse inferences should be drawn,128 United 
Kingdom judges are required to provide a direction to the jury outlining how 
section 34 operates in the particular case.129 However, these directions are very 
complex and have become the subject of substantial appellate case law. 
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Particular difficulties arise with respect to the length and complexity of the 
direction and whether a misdirection will result in an unsafe conviction.  
In the United Kingdom, the Crown Bench Book almost immediately introduced 
a section 34 guideline direction to assist judges.130 This practice is unusual and 
signifies how difficult this legislation is to understand and apply.131 The 
guideline direction itself consists of 10 pages including commentary, making it 
one of the most lengthy and complicated directions in the Crown Bench 
Books.132 The England and Wales Court of Appeal has stated that, although a 
detailed direction is necessary, the direction is of such length and detail that it 
actually promotes the drawing of adverse inferences from silence to a level that 
is inconsistent with the intention of the direction.133 This suggests to juries that 
section 34 should be given greater weight than ‘common sense’ might advise. 
Further, the sheer length of the direction makes it difficult for a jury to fully 
understand and apply it. The desire to avoid unwarranted confusion for juries134 
has led appellate courts to discourage prosecutors from seeking to apply section 
34 unless absolutely necessary in the circumstances of the case.135 
In New South Wales, the Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book has now been 
updated to insert a cross-reference to Special Bulletin 31, which contains a 
discussion of section 89A.136 The previous guideline direction was relatively 
simple, consisting of 10 short paragraphs, including commentary.137 However, 
Special Bulletin 31 consists of an additional 12 paragraphs. The Bulletin 
highlights a number of complexities in the new section, particularly with 
reference to the issues which have arisen in the United Kingdom. While the 
Bulletin itself does not provide a guideline direction, it expressly refers to the 
United Kingdom guideline direction and therefore imports the perceived issues 
that have arisen under section 34, including the fact that the length and 
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complexity of the direction is thought to cause confusion for juries, and elevate 
the perceived importance of the provision to juries. Recent Australian reports 
into judicial directions generally have concluded that jury directions are already 
overly complex, confusing and even unintelligible to juries.138 Thus the 
additional length and complexity of the section 89A judicial direction is likely 
to amplify this issue, causing additional confusion for jurors.  
In the United Kingdom, the content of the section 34 direction has become a 
significant source of appellate review. Courts originally considered that, 
because the provision makes inroads into a right previously considered 
fundamental, any misdirection was of grave importance. In a number of cases 
convictions have been deemed unsafe because of a judge’s misdirection in 
relation to section 34, despite a very strong case for the Crown.139 However, the 
England and Wales Court of Appeal has now decided, in the decision of Boyle, 
that a misdirection in relation to section 34 will not automatically mean that the 
conviction was unsafe.140  
In Boyle the two accused were convicted of murder and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. While both the prosecution and the court accepted that there had 
been a significant misdirection in relation to section 34,141 the appeal court 
nevertheless found that the convictions were safe.142 The case involved very 
strong circumstantial evidence, including evidence that both accused dealt in 
drugs with the victim, were seen using a car and gun that were linked to the 
murder, that the co-accused had unexplained injuries, and that the deceased’s 
blood was found on clothing and glasses belonging to both of the accused. 
Boyle gave four ‘no comment’ interviews to police, on the basis of legal advice. 
Upon being charged, Boyle told police that he, the victim and the co-accused 
had injected themselves with drugs, thus purportedly explaining the blood 
evidence. Boyle denied any involvement in the murder and made no further 
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comment. At the trial, Boyle gave oral evidence, consistent with his interview 
with police, but also explained that at the time of the murder he and the co-
accused had been hunting a badger and that their gun had accidentally 
discharged, causing injuries to the co-accused. The trial judge gave direction to 
the jury about the application of section 34 to the ‘no comment’ interviews and 
the reliance on legal advice.143  
The Court of Appeal found, and both parties accepted, that the direction was 
deficient. The nature of the deficiency was that the trial judge had erroneously 
failed to state that an inference could be drawn only if the jury was satisfied 
that the real reason for the silence was that the accused did not have an answer 
which would stand up to scrutiny,144 and that the judge had failed to outline 
which precise facts could give rise to the inference.145 Despite the deficiency, 
the Court of Appeal found that the convictions were safe. Unlike the European 
Court of Human Rights,146 the Court of Appeal stated that an ‘absolutist 
approach’ — that convictions would always be unsafe where there was a 
misdirection in relation to section 34 — was not necessary.147 Instead, a 
conviction may be deemed to be safe if the court finds that the jury was ‘bound 
to convict’, despite the misdirection.148 In Boyle, the Court held that the 
direction given was actually in favour of the accused, as it did not outline all of 
the facts which could have given rise to a section 34 inference and it placed a 
strong emphasis on legal advice.149 Thus, according to the Court of Appeal, if 
the correct direction had been given — outlining all the facts from which an 
inference might be drawn — the jury would have been even more likely to draw 
unfavourable inferences from the silence than on the basis of the direction that 
they were in fact given.150 More importantly, the Court held that members of 
the jury would have been sure, in reaching their verdict, that the explanation 
given at the trial was a late fabrication, satisfying themselves that the real reason 
for the silence was the lack of an innocent explanation.151 Thus, despite the fact 
that the trial judge had failed to direct the jury members to draw inferences only 
where they believed the real reason for the silence was that the accused did not 
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have an answer which would stand up to scrutiny,152 the Court found that the 
jury members  nevertheless had that belief when reaching their verdict. 
Consequently, the Court did not doubt the safety of the convictions and 
dismissed the appeal.153 
Boyle154 highlights the fact that the test in relation to whether a misdirection 
will make a conviction unsafe is quite complex. Unlike a simple absolute 
approach — that all misdirections in relation to section 34 will be miscarriage 
of justice — the test requires the appeal court to uphold a conviction only where 
the court is almost certain that the jury would have reached the same decision 
despite the misdirection. The complexity arises as the appeal court cannot 
definitively know what impact the impugned aspects of the misdirection 
actually had on the decision of the jury members, what weight they gave to the 
section 34 inferences, and whether they would have reached the same decision 
on the basis of the remaining evidence.155 Thus, in determining whether the jury 
was ‘bound to convict’ despite the misdirection, the appeal court must place 
itself in the position of the jury to determine what effect the misdirection would 
have had and whether the verdict would have been the same, irrespective of the 
misdirection. It has been argued that this approach, of the appeal court standing 
in the position of the jury, may prejudice the fairness of the trial, as it usurps 
the role of the jury.156 Further, although in Boyle the misdirection tended to be 
in favour of the accused,157 this will not always be the case.  
It is likely that a similar approach will be taken to misdirections in New South 
Wales. This is primarily due to the existence of the right to a fair trial in both 
jurisdictions. United Kingdom courts are bound by the European Convention 
on Human Rights,158 which includes the right to a fair hearing.159 Because of 
that Convention, the European Court of Human Rights has encouraged United 
Kingdom appeal courts to deal strictly with cases involving misdirections in 
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relation to section 34.160 They have also expressly stated that a fair trial cannot 
be secured by appeal proceedings.161 This is because an appeal court is ‘in no 
position to assess properly whether the jury considered [the weight of evidence] 
to be conclusive of th[e] guilt’162 of the accused. In other words, despite the 
strength of the evidence against the accused, an appeal court cannot know for 
sure that a jury would reach the same verdict. Thus, a determination that a jury 
was ‘bound to convict’, does not afford the accused a fair hearing and should 
be avoided. Contrary to this recommendation, the court in Boyle refused to take 
an absolutist approach that all misdirections will require a re-trial, instead 
looking behind the jury verdict.163 While Australian courts, like those of the 
UK, uphold a common law right to a fair trial,164 this right is arguably narrower 
than that recognised by international conventions.165 Although Australia has 
ratified the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights,166 this 
country does not have domestic legislation which expressly upholds the right 
to a fair trial and, although the existence of such a right is well recognised, 
neither Australian legislation nor its common law contains an exhaustive or 
comprehensive definition of a ‘fair trial’.167 Therefore, it will arguably be even 
less likely that a simple absolutist approach to misdirections will be adopted in 
New South Wales.  
Further, Australian courts already apply a non-absolutist approach to 
misdirections. In the High Court decision of Mule v R,168 the defendants argued 
that the trial judge had erroneously instructed the jury to give less weight to 
some statements made by the accused to police than others. The High Court 
held, taking the directions as a whole, that the jury had not been left with an 
erroneous impression of the applicable law. However, even if there had been a 
misdirection, whether that misdirection amounted to a miscarriage of justice 
was ‘another matter’. The Court stated that the safety of a conviction will 
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instead depend upon whether a ‘jury, acting reasonably’ was left with an 
erroneous impression of the law, due to the misdirection.169 Like the United 
Kingdom approach, this approach looks behind the jury verdict to determine 
the impact of the misdirection on the jury’s decision. Again, the appeal court 
cannot know what impression the jury members actually had or whether they 
would have reached the same verdict without the misdirection. Given that this 
test is already applied with respect to misdirections, it is likely that a similar 
approach will be extended to the new section 89A. However, unlike the 
previous straightforward direction in relation to evidence of silence, the new 
section 89A direction is lengthy and complex, making it difficult to determine 
what impact the misdirection may have had on the verdict. Thus, it is likely that 
section 89A will introduce the same uncertainties as the United Kingdom 
direction.  
B When Is the Section Triggered? Positive Defence 
Apart from the judicial direction itself, there is also uncertainty in the United 
Kingdom about whether section 34 will apply at all. One of the areas of 
controversy is whether or not the accused has mounted a positive defence at 
trial. The inference under section 34 will not arise simply as a result of the 
accused person’s silence. Rather, the accused person must have failed to 
mention a fact which was later ‘relied on in his defence’170 in the proceedings. 
(The same requirement is evident in section 89A.)171 This means that the 
accused must raise facts or evidence as a positive defence for section 34 to 
apply. While this is generally a straightforward matter, in some cases it can be 
difficult to determine whether the accused had raised a positive defence in the 
proceedings.172 
Although this issue has been raised in a number of cases, Smith173 demonstrates 
the difficulty clearly. In that case, Smith and the co-accused, Burgess, were 
charged with attempted robbery. The prosecution alleged that Burgess 
approached the victim and, after asking the victim for money, punched the 
victim in the face. The prosecution also alleged that Smith had assisted by 
standing between the victim and his escape route and by threatening to beat the 
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victim. Smith, acting on legal advice, gave a ‘no comment’ interview.174 At 
trial, Smith gave evidence that he was a mere bystander and did not threaten 
the victim. He also supported the narrative of Burgess, stating that Burgess had 
asked for a cigarette and not money. The trial judge gave a section 34 direction, 
stating that Smith’s evidence that he had been present but had played no part in 
the offence could give rise to a section 34 inference.  
Smith appealed the decision on the basis that a section 34 direction should not 
have been given. The appeal court found that the direction was erroneous and 
allowed the appeal175 on the basis that the facts identified by the trial judge as 
giving rise to the adverse inferences were incorrect.176 In particular, the fact that 
the accused was present was an agreed fact and therefore could not give rise to 
any adverse inference, as there could be no suggestion that that fact was a late 
fabrication.177 Further, Smith’s bare denial of participation in the offence could 
not give rise to adverse inferences, as this was not a positive defence.178 The 
appeal court’s reasoning was that, if a bare denial, first made at trial, could give 
rise to an adverse inference, then there would be ‘no practical difference’179 
between this and treating silence alone as evidence of guilt. It would, contrary 
to the purpose of the section,180 allow inferences against the accused based 
simply on the fact that he had not denied the allegations when interviewed, 
rather than because of a risk that the denial was a late fabrication.  
The prosecution also argued that Smith’s evidence, positively supporting 
Burgess’ version of events, amounted to a positive defence.181 The prosecution 
submitted that this could lead to an inference that there had been a late 
fabrication between the two accused. Such an inference invoked the application 
of section 34.182 However, the appeal court rejected this argument on three 
grounds. First, Smith had not been asked about what Burgess had said to the 
victim in the police interview. Second, the suggestion that Smith’s evidence 
that Burgess had asked for a cigarette was a late concoction had not been put to 
Smith, and, finally, the trial judge had not specifically referred to that evidence 
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as giving rise to the section 34 direction.183 Therefore, the judge should have 
directed the jury members that they should not draw any adverse inferences 
from Smith’s silence.184 
Smith highlights one of the key principles of section 34: that an accused must 
mount a positive defence before adverse inferences can be drawn. It is clear that 
such a principle will not always be straightforward. In Smith, although the 
accused did not disclose the fact that he had been present as a mere bystander 
until his trial, this failure of disclosure could not be held against him.185 
However, a reasonable jury may nevertheless have expected him to mention 
that information when interviewed. This makes it difficult for the trial judge to 
determine whether or not section 34 will apply. It is not simply a question of 
whether a fact is first raised at trial, but whether the accused had failed to 
mention that fact because it was a later fabrication.186 Thus the trial judge must 
hypothesise as to the reason why the fact was withheld. This difficulty could 
lead to greater confusion and uncertainty in other factual scenarios where it is 
less clear that the accused is making a bare denial.187 
The new legislation in New South Wales is likely to introduce the same issues 
into NSW law. As discussed above, section 89A adopts identical wording in 
many respects to that of section 34. In particular, the relevant fact must be 
‘relied upon in [the defendant’s] defence’188 in the proceedings in order for 
adverse inferences to be drawn. Also, the New South Wales legislation 
expressly defines ‘agreed fact’ elsewhere to mean ‘a fact that the parties to a 
proceeding have agreed is not … to be disputed’.189 This is analogous with the 
United Kingdom interpretation, that an agreed fact is a matter which is ‘agreed 
to be true’.190 Therefore, in all relevant respects, both jurisdictions interpret the 
definition of ‘agreed fact’ in the same manner. Finally, Special Bulletin 31 
expressly refers to the United Kingdom case law for guidance on this issue.191 
Therefore, given the identical wording and interpretation of the term ‘agreed 
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fact’, it is likely that the same principles will apply to and the same confusion 
be caused by section 89A.  
However, even greater complexity may arise in New South Wales because there 
is no equivalent to section 35. That provision allows United Kingdom courts to 
draw adverse inferences from the accused’s failure to give oral evidence at the 
trial.192 Therefore, in the United Kingdom, the accused cannot avoid adverse 
inferences simply by not giving evidence.193 However in New South Wales, 
where there is no such provision, a defendant could potentially avoid 
unfavourable inferences by giving no evidence at trial and thus not relying on 
facts which he or she had failed to mention earlier.194 This scenario will be 
governed by section 20 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which allows a judge 
to ‘comment on a failure of the defendant to give evidence’, but provides that 
the ‘comment’ must not suggest that the failure to give evidence was because 
the defendant was, or believed he or she was, guilty of the offence. However, 
due to the imprecise wording of section 20, particularly the vagueness of the 
term ‘comment on’, the common law may nevertheless apply. The common law 
would allow inferences of guilt to be drawn from silence only where the 
relevant facts are peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge and call for some 
explanation.195 Nevertheless, New South Wales courts may be faced with 
further issues where accused persons choose not to give evidence at trial, 
because section 89A will not apply, even where there was non-disclosure by 
the defendant, unless the defendant relies on a fact in the proceedings. This 
highlights a possible oversight in the section.    
C What Constitutes a ‘Fact Relied Upon’? 
The fact that the defence mounted by the accused must rely upon ‘facts’ also 
causes debate and renders the application of section 34 complex.196 The court 
must distinguish between facts and the mere testing or probing of the 
prosecution case. Initially, United Kingdom courts restricted the term ‘fact’ to 
evidentiary facts.197 Therefore section 34 was invoked only where actual 
evidence was relied upon by the defence and not where speculations, 
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suggestions or possible explanations had been put from the bar table in cross-
examination.198 However, more recent authorities have given the term ‘fact’ a 
broad rather than a ‘narrow or pedantic meaning’.199 This has led to confusion 
about what is considered a ‘fact’ for the purposes of section 34.  
The decision of Webber200 highlights this issue.201 The question on appeal in 
that case was whether a suggestion put to a prosecution witness was a ‘fact’ 
which invoked section 34. In Webber the appellant had been charged with 
conspiracy to murder in relation to an alleged drive-by shooting. When 
questioned by police, Webber simply denied that he had been present. At the 
trial, the prosecution called both the victim and the victim’s associate, who had 
both been present at the alleged shooting. Counsel for Webber put to the victim 
and the victim’s associate a version of events. He suggested that the victim’s 
associate had actually planned to ambush Webber, and that it had in fact been 
the victim and his associate who had first fired shots at the car, which had then 
driven away with Webber firing a single shot into the air. Both witnesses denied 
this version of events. Webber did not give oral evidence at the trial. The trial 
judge gave a section 34 direction. He stated that the jury could draw adverse 
inferences if they believed that the accused could reasonably have been 
expected to mention to police the version of events put to the witnesses.202  
On appeal, it was argued that only evidentiary facts could trigger the application 
of section 34. Webber submitted that suggestions put to a witness were not 
evidence unless accepted by that witness, and therefore that the section 34 
direction should not have been given.203 However, the House of Lords was of 
the opinion that the term ‘fact’ should instead be given a broad meaning.204 It 
held that, if an accused or their counsel raised a fact, explanation or account, 
which, if it were true, the accused could have been expected to disclose earlier, 
then this would be a fact relied upon for the purposes of section 34.205 
Therefore, because counsel had put a ‘specific and positive’206 case to the 
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prosecution witnesses, he had gone beyond merely probing or testing.207 It was 
therefore open to the jury members to draw adverse inferences if they were 
satisfied that the accused could reasonably have been expected to mention the 
explanation earlier.   
The logic of this reasoning is questionable. The implication is that, even if a 
suggestion is not accepted by the witness, and therefore does not become 
evidence or provide any evidentiary value to the accused, it may still invoke the 
application of section 34.208 The test relies upon a very fine distinction between 
facts and hypotheses.209 In Webber, because a sufficiently specific and positive 
suggestion was made, it was considered a fact relied upon.210 However, in other 
decisions the distinction is not as clear.211 Problems may arise, particularly in 
relation to purely circumstantial cases.212 In such cases the accused often raise 
reasonable doubt by offering, within ethical limits, possible innocent 
explanations for the evidence. The decision in Webber could potentially 
undermine this practice, affecting the evidentiary burden of proof. The rule that 
‘fact’ is no longer restricted to evidentiary facts may also impose an expectation 
on accused persons that they will disclose possible theoretical explanations 
when they are first questioned by police. This will force courts, and juries, to 
consider the difficult question of whether it was reasonable in the circumstances 
to expect the defendant to disclose such ‘facts’ when questioned.213 
The broader definition of ‘facts’ similarly creates issues for legal 
representatives. As the court acknowledged in Webber, although counsel must 
mount the best possible defence for their client, they will be inhibited by the 
concern that any suggestion put to a witness could invoke section 34.214 The 
House of Lords indicated that counsel may still test the prosecution case by 
hypotheses; however counsel must ensure that it is clear that the facts put to the 
witness are mere suggestions and are not facts relied upon.215 Further, the House 
of Lords cautioned that legal representatives might only advance a positive 
defence on clear instructions from their client.216 Therefore counsel must ensure 
that their client fully understands the complex operation of section 34, so that 
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the client can provide informed instructions. This will likely create problems 
for legal practitioners.  
Given the similarity of the wording of section 89A to the United Kingdom 
provision, there is no reason to believe that the New South Wales legislation 
will be able to avoid these complexities. Both sections refer to a failure to 
mention ‘facts’ later relied upon at trial.217 Further, there is nothing in either 
piece of legislation to expressly define the term ‘fact’.218 Therefore, given that 
the United Kingdom case law is likely to be persuasive,219 particularly as 
Webber is expressly referred to in the New South Wales Bench Book,220 it 
appears that similar principles will apply in relation to section 89A. Thus, the 
new provision will cause the same difficulties in the interpretation of the term 
‘fact’ as are experienced in the United Kingdom.  
D When Will It Be ‘Reasonable’ to Remain Silent? 
Due to the uncertainty surrounding section 34, legal practitioners have sought 
to avoid the application of this provision altogether. One method of avoiding 
section 34 is to argue for the ‘reasonable explanation’. Under the United 
Kingdom provision, adverse inferences may be drawn only where the accused 
‘could reasonably have been expected to mention’221 the fact which is later 
relied upon. Therefore, where the accused has a reasonable explanation for not 
disclosing the relevant fact, no inferences may be drawn.222 Again, the same 
requirement is evident in section 89A.223 It is arguably unreasonable to expect 
an accused person to mention certain facts when he or she has not received full 
disclosure from police,224 is unfamiliar with the legal system,225 has received 
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legal advice,226 or believes that he or she is being unlawfully detained.227 The 
question of reasonableness will generally be left to the jury, unless the judge is 
satisfied that in the circumstances no reasonable jury could find that adverse 
inferences were appropriate.228 However, the content of the judicial direction 
about this issue has produced significant uncertainty.  
One of the most highly litigated issues in this area is the reliance on legal 
advice.229 When an accused person is advised by his solicitor to remain silent, 
the question arises of whether this was reasonable in the circumstances. The 
law on this issue in the United Kingdom remains unsettled and complex. While 
one line of authority suggests that it is the ‘genuineness’ of the defendant’s 
reliance on the legal advice which is relevant,230 the other identifies the relevant 
question as whether it is objectively reasonable in all of the circumstances to 
have relied on the advice.231 
The issue was discussed at length in the decision of Hoare.232 In that case two 
defendants had been charged with producing and conspiring to supply 
prohibited drugs. The facts involved a large-scale manufacture of 
amphetamines by Hoare, and the supply of that drug by both Hoare and Pierce. 
The accused were arrested when Hoare delivered a box containing 
amphetamines to Pierce. Pierce, who is most relevant for this discussion, was 
accompanied by his solicitor when interviewed by police. At the start of the 
interview, Pierce’s solicitor stated that he believed that his client was being 
unlawfully detained and had therefore advised his client not to answer police 
questions. Pierce then answered ‘no comment’ to all questions, except to state 
that he did not know what was in the box.233 At the trial Pierce gave oral 
evidence, stating that the delivery was the first he had received from Hoare and 
that he believed that it contained glassware. Pierce, in cross-examination, stated 
that he gave a ‘no comment’ interview on the basis of legal advice. Pierce’s 
solicitor also gave oral evidence outlining his advice. The prosecution then 
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sought to adduce evidence of the ‘no comment’ interview. Counsel for Pierce 
objected on the ground that the evidence had been obtained during a period of 
unlawful detention.234 However, the judge found that the detention was not 
unlawful and the evidence was adduced. The trial judge then gave a section 34 
direction.  
One of the grounds of appeal was that the trial judge had misdirected the jury 
in relation to section 34. In particular, Pierce argued that the trial judge had 
erroneously directed the jury to apply an objective test of reasonableness rather 
than the subjective ‘genuineness’ test in relation to his reliance on legal advice 
and to take into consideration the explanation for the legal advice.235 The Court 
of Appeal rejected this ground. The Court was of the opinion that there was ‘no 
inconsistency’236 between the approaches taken by trial judges in relation to the 
reasonableness of relying on legal advice, despite the perceived disagreement 
between the earlier judgments.237 Auld LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, 
held that the real issue was not genuineness or objective reasonableness, but 
whether or not the legal advice was the true reason for not mentioning the facts 
later relied upon.238 Thus, inferences may only be drawn where the real reason 
for the silence was that the accused had ‘no or no satisfactory explanation’ to 
give.239 It is not a question of whether the accused were entitled, or believed 
they were entitled, not to answer questions, but of whether they relied on the 
legal advice as a shield.240 
The appeal court also held that the jury was entitled to consider the explanation 
given for the legal advice when determining whether it was reasonable for the 
accused to remain silent.241 This seems to conflict with the test itself, as the 
court considered it immaterial whether or not the accused had, or believed that 
he had, a good legal basis for not answering questions.242 Further, where 
accused seek to rely on the explanation for legal advice to justify their silence, 
an issue of waiver of legal professional privilege may arise.243 Nevertheless the 
test is relatively complex to understand and apply, particularly for a lay jury. It 
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requires the jury to go behind the accused person’s explanation for their silence 
and to determine the real reason that the accused relied on the legal advice.  
Given the similarity between section 34 and section 89A, it is likely that the 
same complexities will be introduced into the application of the legislation in 
New South Wales. In particular, both provisions use identical wording to ensure 
that the inferences may be drawn only where the accused, in the circumstances, 
‘could reasonably have been expected to have mentioned’ the facts later relied 
upon.244 Further, as mentioned above, the Bench Book expressly refers to the 
United Kingdom authorities as relevant to the interpretation of the new section 
in New South Wales.245 Therefore it is likely that the ‘reasonable explanation’ 
element of section 89A will operate in the same manner as it does in relation to 
section 34.  
However, unlike the United Kingdom provision, which simply requires that the 
defendant had an opportunity to consult with a solicitor,246 section 89A requires 
an Australian legal practitioner acting for the accused to be present when the 
special caution is being given.247 Although ‘presence’ is not expressly defined 
by the legislation, Greg Smith, in the Second Reading Speech to the new 
legislation, indicated that this is intended to mean the physical presence of a 
legal practitioner.248 This requirement has already created another complexity 
in that it has become common practice for solicitors, in the interests of their 
client, to avoid attending the police interview when their client is charged with 
a serious criminal offence.249 The legislators did foresee this loophole in the 
legislation, referring to it as the ‘choice’ of the accused.250 However, it is 
evident that this requirement has rendered 89A inapplicable in many cases, as 
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astute counsel may avoid the police station to circumvent the application of 
section 89A.251 
IV CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the operation of the equivalent United Kingdom provision 
that section 89A is likely to introduce significant problems into NSW law. Far 
from section 89A taking a common sense approach, it rather introduces 
complexity and uncertainty into the legislation that will make it unworkable. 
The need for extensive and complicated jury directions, the problems in 
determining whether the provision is invoked at all, and the complex test of 
whether it was reasonable for the accused to remain silent, will create 
significant issues in the application of section 89A. When these issues are 
balanced against the minimal benefits expected from the new provision, a 
strong case can be made that the amendment is an unwarranted further intrusion 
into an already eroded right of accused persons. Further, any purported 
efficiency that may be achieved through early disclosure will be offset by the 
substantial inefficiency caused by the problems associated with applying 
section 89A. Unfortunately, due to the highly political nature of the 
amendment, it is unlikely that this legislation will be repealed in the short term 
and any call for its reform would be politically futile. However, in the light of 
this analysis, which shows that New South Wales courts are likely to encounter 
significant and ongoing issues, the close monitoring of this legislation is 
warranted. If the analysis is correct, and the expectation of problems is borne 
out in the short term, it is hoped that at the very least a thorough review of the 
legislation will be undertaken with a view to its possible repeal. 
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